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We evaluate the allocation rationality and ex ante cost eﬃciency of
a major Swedish investment subsidy program, the “Local Investment
Program” (LIP). The LIP, eﬀective between 1998-2002, had dual pur-
poses: to step up the pace at which Sweden transforms into an eco-
logically sustainable society and to reduce unemployment. During the
program period, more than 6.2 billion Swedish kronor (approximately
C = 670 million) were granted to diﬀerent municipal projects. By using
data on the projects’ subsidies and anticipated environmental and em-
ployment eﬀects, we ﬁnd that these eﬀects to a high degree explain the
magnitude of the subsidy granted. We ﬁnd that the marginal LIP sub-
sidy for carbon dioxide (CO2) reductions does not vary signiﬁcantly
over the projects, implying that the LIP was cost eﬃcient for such
reductions. Furthermore, for a majority of the projects, the marginal
subsidy for CO2 reductions was lower than the, at the time, prevailing
CO2 tax. Assuming successful project fulﬁllment, we conclude that
the LIP was a low cost, cost eﬃcient environmental policy for reduc-
ing CO2 emissions provided that the projects generate spillover eﬀects
large enough to justify the subsidy.
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1 Introduction
The Swedish parliament has enacted ﬁfteen environmental quality objectives
to guide Sweden towards a sustainable society.1 These objectives function as
benchmarks in the progress towards the parliament’s goal to solve all major
environmental problems within one generation. Although the environmen-
tal quality objectives are stated in general terms, every objective has clearly
deﬁned interim targets and timetables (Gov. Bill 2000/01:130). For the envi-
ronmental quality objective, “Reduced Climate Impact”, the interim target
is to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) by four percent between
2008 − 2012 relative the level of emissions in 1990 (Gov. Bill 2001/02:55).2
The progress towards these interim targets should be observed and evalu-
ated on a regular basis. According to the government bill 2000/01:130 (Gov.
Bill 2000/01:130), the Swedish environmental quality objectives should be
achieved through cost eﬃcient economic and market instruments as well as
through regulations and voluntary agreements.
In 1997 the Swedish government initiated an investment subsidy program
called Lokala investeringsprogram (Local Investment Program), LIP. The LIP
had dual purposes: to step up the pace at which Sweden transforms into an
ecologically sustainable society and to reduce unemployment.3 During the
program period, 1998 − 2002, more than 6.2 billion Swedish kronor (SEK)
were granted to over 1,800 diﬀerent municipal projects.4 If all LIP projects
are carried out according to plan, the emissions of CO2 will be reduced by
2,085 thousand tonnes, equivalent to 23 percent of the reduction needed to
reach the interim target from the 2010 forecasted level of emissions.5 Thus, if
successful, the LIP will considerably facilitate attainment of Sweden’s interim
target for CO2 reductions.
From economic theory there are few reasons for subsidizing polluters. On
1The environmental quality objectives are: Reduced Climate Impact; Clean Air; Natu-
ral Acidiﬁcation Only; A Non-Toxic Environment; A Protective Ozone Layer; A Safe Ra-
diation Environment; Zero Eutrophication; Flourishing Lakes and Streams; Good-Quality
Groundwater; A Balanced Marine Environment, Flourishing Coastal Areas and Archipela-
gos; Thriving Wetlands; Sustainable Forests; A Varied Agricultural Landscape; A Mag-
niﬁcent Mountain Landscape and A Good Built Environment.
2According to the EU burden sharing agreement, Sweden is, however, allowed to in-
crease its emissions by four percent.
3According to the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) webpage about
the LIP (www.naturvardsverket.se), increased employment was subordinated ecological
sustainability.
4Prices are current unless otherwise stated. C = 1 was on average equal to SEK 9.16 in
2002 (www.riksbank.se).
5The forcasted emissions of CO2 in 2010 are 62,794 thousand tonnes and the “four
percent less” interim target is 53,823 thousand tonnes (Östblom, 2003).Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 2
the contrary, the economic prescription for negative external eﬀects like pol-
lution is often a corrective tax (c.f. Baumol and Oates, 1988). Nonetheless,
“spillover” eﬀects from investments in new technology may motivate subsi-
dies to R&D.6 In fact, since some of the LIP subsidies were granted to R&D
investments in new technology, the rationale for the LIP should primarily be
seeked in the investments’ spillover eﬀects rather than in the program’s en-
vironmental and employment eﬀects. Presently, too short a time has elapsed
since the introduction of the LIP to be able to gauge the magnitude of the
spillover eﬀects. Nonetheless, smaller spillover eﬀects are of course needed to
justify a subsidy program that is cost eﬃcient.
This paper seeks to, at the general level, empirically gain increased knowl-
edge about the allocation rationality and ex ante cost eﬃciency of the LIP.
We try to answer three related questions: i) was the allocation of the LIP
subsidies “rational”, following some implicit rule7; ii) was the allocation of
t h eL I Ps u b s i d i e sc o s te ﬃcient with respect to CO2 emissions8; iii) was the
LIP relative cost eﬃcient compared to other economic policy instrument, e.g.
the CO2 tax.
Using the quantiﬁed information that was available to the decision mak-
ers at the time of decision making, we model the relationship between the
LIP subsidy and the project’s anticipated environmental and employment ef-
fects. Our main focus is on projects aimed at reducing CO2 emissions. This
“CO2 subsample”, constituting approximately a third of all LIP projects
(nCO2 =6 0 2 ), received a disproportionate (almost 50 percent) amount of
the LIP subsidies. In addition to the subsample’s sizable magnitude, the
expected achievements of the CO2 subsample are particularly interesting to
evaluate considering the Swedish government’s 2003 launching of a successor
to the LIP, Klimatinvesteringsprogram (KLIMP),9 aimed only at reducing
greenhouse gases.
Based on the government’s guidelines for LIP applications (Regeringskansliet,
2000a), we formulate a general subsidy function where the magnitude of the
subsidy depends on the projects’ ex ante anticipated environmental and em-
ployment eﬀects. Having no a priori knowledge about the subsidy function’s
6A spillover eﬀect is positive external eﬀect - a market failure forcing a wedge between
the social and private returns to R&D.
7Communication with a Swedish oﬃcial involved in the allocation process, gave the
impression that the allocation was a stepwise procedure involving several administrators.
We formally test if the allocation mechanism was ad hoc or following some implicit rule.
8According to the LIP ordinance (SFS 1998:23), cost eﬃciency was not a formal re-
quirement.
9The climate investment program (author’s translation). In the KLIMP, project cost
eﬃciency is required (4§ SFS 2003:262).Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 3
properties, we perform sequential Taylor order expansions of the function
with respect to the most frequently nonzero anticipated project eﬀects, i.e.
CO2, NOx, SO2 and L. When estimating the ﬁrst and a second order Taylor
expansions of the subsidy function using data on the projects’ subsidies and
anticipated eﬀects, we ﬁnd that the projects’ anticipated eﬀects to a high
degree explain the size of the LIP subsidy granted (both model speciﬁca-
tions). We see this as evidence of a rational allocation process. The second
order Taylor expansion of the subsidy function shows that the marginal LIP
subsidy for CO2 reductions have little variation over projects, implying that
the LIP was cost eﬃcient for CO2 reductions. Furthermore, the marginal
subsidy for CO2 reductions was, for a majority of the projects, lower than
the prevailing CO2 tax. Thus - postulating successful project fulﬁllment -
the LIP achieves the anticipated CO2 reductions eﬃciently and at low cost,
proviso the existence of positive spillover eﬀects.10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the
LIP and the data used. Section three discusses under what circumstances
polluters could be subsidized and the cost eﬃciency of environmental policies.
Section four presents the model used and, in Section ﬁve, the estimation
results are given. Finally, in a concluding section, we discuss the key ﬁndings.
2 The Local Investment Program
The central idea behind the LIP was to use local, municipal, knowledge
about environmental problems and opportunities for sustainable develop-
ment. Eligible to apply was all Swedish municipalities or alliances thereof.
Every municipal application could contain many diﬀerent, three year projects
provided that the projects were based on local conditions and needs. Com-
panies, individuals and organizations could gain access to the subsidies if
a municipality included their project in its application. According to the
LIP guidelines (Regeringskansliet, 2000a), every project’s anticipated envi-
ronmental and long and short term employment eﬀects should be quantiﬁed
in the application.
Between 1998 and 2001, the LIP subsidies were allocated by the govern-
ment after preparation in the Ministry of the Environment. In 2002, the
allocation was transferred to the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). Whereas the latter administration and allocation model is traditional
for distribution of government subsidies in Sweden, the former is unusual in
at least three ways. First, applications for governmental subsidies are usually
10This may be a bold proviso. According to Berglund and Hanberger (2003), the re-
quirement for new technology was not present in the 2000 − 2002 allocations.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 4
processed by the “relevant” public authority, not by the government itself.
Although many LIP projects are sector crossing, the most relevant public
authority would have been the Swedish EPA. Second, investments eligible
for subsidies are usually clearly deﬁned and speciﬁed. In the LIP, municipal-
ities had to compete for subsidies with projects of very diﬀerent character.
Third, subsidies are normally allocated on a “ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served” basis.
During 1998 and 1999 there was an annual deadline for the LIP applications.
Altogether, these diﬀerences gave the government large degrees of freedom
in the allocation of subsidies, especially during 1998 − 2001. Because of the
unusual administration model and the sizable magnitude of the LIP subsidy,
we are interested in examining the allocation mechanism that governed the
decision making.
Although the government allocation model that prevailed between 1998−
2001, has been criticized, especially for its 1998 allocation (Kågeson and Lid-
mark, 1998; Riksrevisionsverket, 1999; Riksdagens Revisorer, 1999; Dahlberg
and Johansson, 2000), none has, as far as we know, previously examined
the relationship between the subsidies granted and the projects’ anticipated
environmental and employment eﬀects. That no such evaluation has been
performed is surprising, particularly since the guidelines for LIP applications
s t a t et h a t“ (T)he projects will, above all, be evaluated on basis of the munic-
ipalities’ assessment of the projects’ results and eﬀects regarding sustainable
development and increased employment in relation to the subsidy applied for”
(Regeringskansliet, 2000a, p. 3).11
According to the LIP ordinance (SFS 1998:23), the LIP subsidy could
constitute a maximum of 30 percent of the total investment costs. For the LIP
projects, the ex ante average share of subsidies to investments is, nonetheless,
35 percent (ranging between 0.7 − 100 percent). Table 1 gives the number
of projects and subsidies granted during the program period. Overall, more
than 1,800 projects in 128 diﬀerent municipalities were granted subsidies
exceeding SEK 6.2 billion. Evident is that the total amount of subsidies was
largest in 1998 while the total subsidies in 2001 and 2002 were signiﬁcantly
smaller.
The LIP subsidies were used both for municipal investments in equipment
and capital, as well as for information and education. Many of the projects
involved measures to promote eﬃcient use of energy, electricity and water,
and of measures to recover, recycle and compost waste. Altogether, the
projects were categorized in twelve diﬀerent project groups.12
11Author’s translation.
12The twelve project groups were: nature conservation and biological diversity; water
and sewage; remedial measures; waste; traﬃc; energy eﬃciency measures; conversion to re-
newable energy sources; building measures; multi-dimensional projects; industrial projects;Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 5
Table 1: Number of projects, total subsidy and average subsidy with standard
error (SE), all projects.
Year Projects Total subsidy Average subsidy SE
(SEK) (SEK/project)
1998 456 2,320,457,100 5,088,722 976,822
1999 413 1,432,778,900 3,469,198 566,357
2000 507 1,487,356,470 2,933,642 343,196
2001 315 733,038,250 2,327,106 238,592
2002 123 236,348,500 1,921,533 298,184
Total 1,814 6,209,979,200 3,423,362 297,857
Information about the projects’ anticipated environmental and employ-
ment eﬀects can be found in the “LIP database”, maintained ﬁrst by the
Ministry of the Environment and then by the EPA.
2.1 Data
T h ed a t au s e di nt h i sp a p e ri sd e r i v e df r o mt h eS w e d i s hE P A ’ sL I Pd a t a b a s e .
The LIP database contains information about all projects granted LIP subsi-
dies during the program period. From a municipal perspective, the data could
be viewed as an unbalanced panel since every municipality in the database
received subsidies for a minimum of one and a maximum of ﬁve program
years.13 However, from the project perspective adopted here, the data is no
panel since every project only shows up once.
The LIP database contains information about the subsidies granted and
the total investments as well as information about the projects’ anticipated
environmental eﬀects, as assessed by the municipalities’ in their LIP appli-
c a t i o n s( s e eA p p e n d i xAf o ra l lt h ev a r i a b l e s ) . 14
Focussing on the subset of LIP projects aimed at CO2 reductions, Table
2 shows a similar pattern to Table 1, where total as well as average subsidies
support measures; other projects (Regeringskansliet, 2000b).
13One municipality received subsidies four times (years), ﬁve municipalities received
subsidies three times and 34 municipalities received subsidies two times.
14In the LIP database there is also a variable labelled “Environmental Text” whose
contents we disregard in the analysis. This variable could potentially contain anticipated
environmental eﬀects not stated elsewhere. The problem with including this variable is
that it is very diﬃcult to judge whether the contents are mere explanations of anticipated
environmental eﬀects stated elsewhere or nonstated anticipated environmental eﬀects. We
choose to exclude the contents of this variable in the analysis at the risk of omitting
important, but most likely minor, anticipated environmental eﬀects.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 6
Table 2: Number of projects, total and average subsidies with standard errors
(SE) for the CO2 sample.
Year Projects Total subsidy Average subsidy SE
(SEK) (SEK/project)
1998 141 976,143,000 6,923,000 2,850,185
1999 130 826,418,400 6,357,065 1,644,701
2000 159 750,925,570 4,722,802 899,644
2001 114 399,141,650 3,501,243 487,568
2002 58 116,923,000 2,015,914 371,845
Total 602 3,069,551,620 5,098,923 799,242
decrease every year throughout the program period.
From Table 3 it is evident that the CO2 projects can be found in all
diﬀerent project groups, although the greatest number of projects can be
f o u n di nt h e“ e n e r g yc o n v e r s i o n ”a n dt h e“ t r a ﬃc” groups. The purpose of
many projects in the “energy conversion” group is to extend biofuel-based
local and district heating networks and to replace, or upgrade, inferior heating
systems. In the “traﬃc” group, many of the projects have purposes related
to improvements in public transport and expansion of pedestrian walkways
and cycle tracks. This project group also includes investments in systems for
using biogas as a vehicle fuel and purchases of vehicles that run on fuel from
renewable sources.
Unconditionally, i.e. without consideration to the projects’ other eﬀects,
the average project subsidy for a kilo’s reduction of CO2 p e ry e a ri sS E K389
(SE 121.2). The largest average project subsidy is SEK 60,000 per kilo and
a n n u mw h i l et h el o w e s ti sS E K0.02 per kilo and annum. The median subsidy
is SEK 2.79 per kilo CO2 and annum.15 Judging by the these numbers, there
is a great variability in the subsidy for CO2 reductions over the LIP projects.
To examine the cost eﬃciency of the LIP subsidy it is, however, imperative
to condition the subsidy granted on all anticipated eﬀects.
In the manifold cases where nothing is stated for an anticipated eﬀect,
we assume this eﬀect to be zero (descriptive statistics including the number
of zero observations per variable are given in Appendix B). This assumption
seems justiﬁed considering that the municipalities rather would have had
incentives to overstate than to understate the project’s anticipated beneﬁcial
15For SO2 reductions, the average subsidy is SEK 81,838 per kilo (median: SEK 3,443)
and the span from the smallest to the largest subsidy is SEK 7.30 − 8,373,750.F o rNOx
reductions, the average subsidy cost is SEK 63,844 per kilo (median: SEK 2,477)a n dt h e
span between minimum and maximum subsidies is SEK 0.60 − 5,582,500 per kilo.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 7
Table 3: Number of projects, total and average subsidies and anticipated
annual CO2 reductions per project group for the CO2 sample.
Project group Projects Total subsidy Average subsidy ∆ CO2
(SEK) (SEK/project) (tonnes/year)
Waste (G1) 41 250,390,600 6,107,088 97,464
Building (G2) 4 11,022,000 2,755,500 323
Remedial (G3) 1 2,235,000 2,235,000 872
Energy eﬃciency (G4) 91 316,787,120 3,481,177 480,473
Energy conversion (G5) 300 1,441,597,500 4,805,325 1,334,343
Multi-dimensional (G6) 23 496,057,000 21,567,696 19,849
Industrial (G7) 3 3,315,000 1,105,000 958
Nature conserv. (G8) 1 106,000 106,000 49
Support (G9) 5 3,085,000 617,000 18,691
Traﬃc (G10) 113 504,899,400 4,468,136 131,362
Water & sewage (G11) 18 39,260,000 2,181,111 589
Other (G12) 2 797,000 398,500 3
Total 602 3,069,551,620 5,098,923 2,084,977
environmental and employment eﬀects. Only if there are other, nonzero,
nonstated anticipated environmental eﬀects known to the decision maker and
incorporated into the decision making will this assumption bias our results.
Understating or neglecting anticipated environmental eﬀects is more likely to
occur with anticipated detrimental environmental eﬀects - a fact also noted
by Riksrevisionsverket (1999). Another potential empirical problem with
including all other environmental and employment eﬀe c t si st h a ts o m ee ﬀects
may be signiﬁcantly correlated due to double counting. For instance, when
both the direct eﬀect of a project (e.g. energy savings) and its consequences
(e.g. reduced emissions of CO2 and sulphur dioxide, SO2)a r et a k e ni n t o
account, the latter values are related to the former. The empirical analysis
will reveal whether this constitutes a problem or not.
Most likely, the LIP database does not give the whole truth about the LIP
projects’ anticipated environmental eﬀects. On the other hand, the informa-
tion in the LIP database was, together with the full applications (which, of
course, included more descriptive information, blueprints et cetera), all in-
formation that was available to the decision makers at the time of decision
making.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 8
Table 4: Emissions of CO2, NOx and SO2, 1990-2001 (1,000 tonnes) (MI 18
SM 0201 and Summary Reports for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories,
submissions 2002 and 2003).
CO2 NOx SO2
1990 56,056 349 111
1991 56,735 340 102
1992 54,958 328 89
1993 54,879 320 80
1994 59,233 334 81
1995 58,574 309 69
1996 62,056 309 74
1997 57,056 291 66
1998 58,142 277 63
1999 56,458 267 54
2000 55,855 247 58
2001 55,269 251 60
2.2 Swedish Emissions
Our analysis will, as previously stated, be concentrated on the anticipated
CO2 reductions of the LIP. Nonetheless, we will also pay due respect to the
LIP applications’ two other most frequently stated nonzero environmental
eﬀects, i.e. reductions of nitrogen oxides (NOx)a n dSO2,a sw e l la st ot h e
eﬀects on employment.
Table 4 gives Swedish emissions of CO2, NOx and SO2 between 1990
and 2001. Whereas the emissions of NOx and SO2 have been decreasing
over time, there is no trend distinguishable in the emissions of CO2.A n
interim target of the environmental quality objective “Natural Acidiﬁcation
Only”, is to cut SO2 emissions to air to 60,000 tonnes in 2010. This interim
target was achieved in 1999. An interim target for the environmental quality
objectives “Natural Acidiﬁcation Only” and “Zero Eutrophication” is to cut
NOx emissions to air to 148,000 tonnes in 2010. If successfully carried out
according to plan, the LIP projects will reduce NOx emissions by 20 thousand
tonnes, amounting to almost 20 p e r c e n to ft h er e d u c t i o nn e e d e dt oa t t a i nt h e
interim NOx target from the 2001 level of emissions.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 9
3 Why Subsidize Polluters?
From economic theory, there are few reasons for subsidizing polluters. On the
contrary, the economic prescription for negative external eﬀects like pollution
is in most cases a corrective tax (c.f. Baumol and Oates, 1988). Although it
may seem objectionable, both on economic and moral grounds (the “polluters
pay principle” is abandoned), we can think of at least one reason for govern-
ments to subsidize large scale investment programs like the LIP, - “spillover”
eﬀects.
Some of the LIP subsidies were granted to R&D investments in new tech-
nology. Such investments have the potential of spillover eﬀects, i.e. indirect
or unexpected beneﬁts to others (e.g. ﬁrms in the industry) through, for
instance, knowledge diﬀusion or development of technological skills. Accord-
ing to Klette et al. (2000), spillover eﬀects are the main justiﬁcation for
governmental subsidies to commercial R&D and, in the case of the LIP, the
social beneﬁts from spillover eﬀects could justify the program. Presently,
it is however diﬃcult to gauge the magnitude of the actual spillover eﬀects
from the LIP since many of the projects still are being implemented. Clearly,
estimating the spillover eﬀects is an important issue for future research. Here
we simply assume that the spillover eﬀects are large enough to motivate the
government subsidies.
Government subsidies may also be necessary when it is diﬃcult, for legal
or other reasons, to make the liable party pay for environmental damages
made. Measures to reduce the environmental and health risks from haz-
ardous waste sites contaminated prior to modern environmental legislation
and measures to recreate wetlands are two examples where governmental
subsidies may be indispensable (Kågeson and Lidmark, 1998). Altogether,
approximately nine percent of the LIP subsidies (SEK 548 million) were
granted to remedial measures and measures to recreate wetlands.
3.1 Cost Eﬃciency of Environmental Policies
A natural selection criteria in the choice of policy instrument is the instru-
ment’s cost eﬃciency. The condition for a cost eﬃcient environmental policy
is that the environmental goal is achieved at the minimum cost to society.16
In general, assuming smooth, continuous and nondecreasing total abate-
ment cost functions, the marginal abatement cost should be equal for all
emitters for cost eﬃciency to prevail. If the marginal cost for abatement is
16Alternatively, if there are budget restrictions, that the maximum environmental beneﬁt
is achieved at a given cost.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 10
smaller for emitter m than for emitter n,s o c i e t yw o u l db e n e ﬁt if emitter
m abated more and n less. With a tax on emissions, emitters will abate
until the marginal cost of abatement is equal to the tax. At higher marginal
abatement costs, the emitters will emit and pay the tax. In this way, the
marginal cost for abatement will be equal for all emitters.
Transferring this marginal cost (tax) argument to the LIP subsidy, the
marginal LIP subsidy per kilo reduced CO2 should not diﬀer signiﬁcantly over
t h ep r o j e c t si no r d e rf o rt h eL I Pt ob ec o s te ﬃcient. Hence, the marginal
CO2 subsidy (MSCO2) - equivalent to the marginal government cost or the
government “shadow price” for CO2 reductions - should be equal in projects
m and n for a cost eﬃcient allocation of the LIP subsidies. To illustrate the
argument, we assume that the LIP subsidy granted project m, Ym, is deter-
mined by the project’s anticipated amount of CO2 reductions (CO2,m)a n d
a vector of other project speciﬁc variables, xm (e.g. other anticipated envi-
ronmental and employment eﬀects). Thus, we assume Ym = h(CO2,m,xm).
Without parameterizing the subsidy function, we state the general condition













MSm,CO2|xm = MSn,CO2|xn ;∀n 6= m.
If the marginal subsidy (the shadow price) for reducing emissions of CO2 is
larger in project n than in project m,s o c i e t yw o u l db e n e ﬁt if subsidies were
transferred from project n to m, so that a larger reduction would take place
at a smaller subsidy.
Variation in the marginal LIP subsidy for CO2 reductions could result if
the LIP allocation process varied over projects and/or years. With a long-
term environmental policy, we see little need for the LIP allocation model
to change during the program period and, if marginal subsidies varies over
projects, the condition for cost eﬃciency is not fulﬁlled. Thus, notwithstand-
ing the cause of variation, the mere existence of signiﬁcant variation points
to cost ineﬃciency of the LIP subsidies.
4M o d e l
According to Riksdagens Revisorer (1999, p. 18) “(T)he subsidies in the local
investment program are eﬀect oriented which means that the results, in the
forms of positive environmental and employment eﬀects, constitute ground
criteria for approval”.17 Furthermore, a recent EPA publication states that
17Author’s translation.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 11
“The most important criterion when judging the LIP applications has been
the anticipated environmental eﬀects of the investment program’s projects”
(Naturvårdsverket and IEH, 2003, p. 7).18 Given these statements, it seems
reasonable to assume that the size of the LIP subsidy was dependent on some
implicit weighing of the project’s anticipated environmental and employment
eﬀects. Consequently, we formulate a model for the subsidy as a function of
the projects’ ex ante anticipated environmental (EE) and employment (L)
eﬀects,
Yijt = g(EEijt,L ijt) i ∈ [1,1814] j ∈ [1,163]19 and t ∈ [1998,2002] (1)
where Yijt is equal to the subsidy (in SEK) in project i in municipality j
at time t, EEijt is a 27 × 1 column vector of the project’s environmental
eﬀects, i.e. ME1−ME24,C O 2,NO x and SO2 (see Appendix A for variable
deﬁnitions).
In order to evaluate the CO2 cost eﬃciency of the LIP we need to examine
the variation in the marginal CO2 subsidy over projects. Thus, we need a
ﬂexible model where we allow the marginal subsidy to vary over projects.
Having no a priori expectation about the functional form of the subsidy
function, we perform sequential Taylor order expansions with respect to the
CO2, NOx, SO2 and L variables. Since the Taylor expansions are nested,
each successive expansion can be tested against the previous in a conventional
F-test (Greene, 1993, ch. 6).
The ﬁrst order Taylor expansion is linear in the environmental and em-
ployment eﬀects,
Yijt = α + EE
0
ijtβ + Lijtγ + εijt, (2)
where α, γ and β are, respectively, the intercept, a scalar parameter and a
27×1 column vector to be estimated. The derivative of the subsidy function
with respect to CO2 gives the marginal subsidy of reducing CO2 emissions
(MSCO2 = βCO2).
Higher order Taylor expansions of the subsidy function contain higher
order variables and interactions between the variables. Formally,
Yijt = α + EE
0
ijtβ + Lijtγ + v
0δ + εijt, (3)
where v is a s × 1 column vector of interaction and higher order variables
and δ is a s × 1 column vector of parameters to be estimated.
18Author’s translation.
19Altogether, 160 of Sweden’s 290 municipalities received LIP subsidies at least once
during the program period. Furthermore, one sewage treatment works (Käppalaförbun-
det), one municipal alliance (Dalslands kommunalförbund) and one housing exhibition
(Bo01) received subsidies.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 12
Given a second order Taylor expansion, the marginal subsidy may vary
over projects, i.e.
MSCO2ijt = βCO2 + δ1NOxijt + δ2SO2ijt + δ3Lijt +2 δ7CO2ijt.
Thus, we get a distribution of the marginal subsidy for CO2 reductions.
The marginal subsidies for NOx (MSNOx), SO2(MSSO2) and L (MSL) can
be similarly derived as the ﬁrst order derivatives of Equation (3). When
evaluating the relative eﬃciency of the LIP, we will compare these marginal
subsidies with the prevailing taxes and fees on CO2,S O 2 and NOx.
5R e s u l t s
Here we present the results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation
of the ﬁrst and second order Taylor expanded model speciﬁcations. The
dependent variable in both models is the consumer price index deﬂated LIP
subsidy (2002 prices).
5.1 First Order Taylor Expansion
The ﬁrst three columns of Table C in Appendix C give the results from esti-
mation of the ﬁrst order Taylor expansion of the subsidy function (Equation
(2)). Interaction variables between L and an indicator variable for year as
well as indicator variables for project group are included. The reason for
including the labour/year interactions is that personal communication with
an oﬃcial at the Swedish EPA gave the impression that the anticipated em-
ployment eﬀect was of greatest importance in the 1998 allocation, but of
less importance the following years. Through including indicator variables
for project group we are able to control for cost diﬀerences between project
groups. Furthermore, because some projects lacked CO2,N O x,S O 2 and/or
L eﬀects, we include indicator variables (αCO2,α NOx,α SO2,α L) equal to one
if a project have zero such eﬀect(s). These additional “alpha” parameters are
needed so that estimation of the relevant CO2,N O x, SO2 and L parameter
only is based on projects with strictly positive such eﬀects.20
From Table C, we see that the CO2 parameter is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve
percent level with a parameter estimate of SEK 0.06 per kilo. The NOx and
SO2 parameters are signiﬁcant with parameter estimates of SEK 0.46 per kilo
and SEK 23 per kilo, respectively. The employment eﬀect is also signiﬁcant,
20This is necessary if we want to interpret the ﬁrst derivative of the general subsidy
function (notwithstanding the order of Taylor expansion) with respect to an environmental
eﬀect as a marginal subsidy.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 13
with a subsidy granted approximately equal to SEK 255,982 per annual em-
ployment opportunity in 1998. Interesting to note is that the subsidy granted
to employment was signiﬁcantly larger in 1998 than in 1999 − 2001, i.e. in
accordance with the observation made by the Swedish EPA oﬃcial. As a
comparison, the cost of an annual employment created in another Swedish
government subsidy program with dual purposes preceding the LIP was be-
tween SEK 250,000 and SEK 384,000 (Ds 1998:13). Even though the real
employment eﬀect of the LIP is diﬃcult to evaluate, the cost for employment
within the LIP is at least no greater than in a comparable program (equally
diﬃcult to evaluate).21
In addition to the aforementioned CO2,N O x and the SO2 eﬀects, six of
the other anticipated environmental eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent
level in the ﬁrst order Taylor expansion (ME2,ME 4,ME 6,ME 11,ME 15,
ME22). Since these environmental eﬀects are given in absolute values, all
parameter estimates should be positive because more of an anticipated en-
vironmental eﬀe c ts h o u l da l w a y sb ep r e f e r r e d . F i v eo ft h es i xs i g n i ﬁcant
variables are positive whereas one variable, energy savings (ME4), is neg-
ative, implying that for every MWh energy saved by a project, the project
receives SEK 9.22 less in subsidies. This is a little disturbing since there is
no obvious reason why an environmental eﬀect should be punished. A pos-
sible explanation is that this negative eﬀect is due to the earlier mentioned
possible of double counting of environmental eﬀects.
Altogether, the ﬁrst order Taylor expansion of the subsidy function has
a high degree of explanatory power with an R-square adjusted equal to 0.84.
Thus, the LIP allocation process appear to be rational, following an implicit
weighing rule.
5.2 Second Order Taylor Expansion
The results from estimation of the second order Taylor expansion are given in
the last three columns of Table C. In an F-test between the ﬁrst and second
order expansions, the null of the ﬁrst order expansion is rejected.22 Higher
order Taylor expansions were also tested for. Whereas expansions to the third
order could not be rejected in an F-test, expansion to the fourth order was
rejected. In the third order expansion, 20 more variables are added, which
21Note that an empirical complication is that project employment is indistinguishable
from permanent employment since there is only one employment variable in the LIP
database. Altogether, the anticipated employment eﬀect of the LIP consists of more than
19,600 employment opportunities (permanent and/or project).
22F-statistic (9,1756) = 20.69. The constraint on the square of CO2 was dropped due
to high collinearity with the CO2 variable.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 14
increase the collinearity between the variables as well as the complexity and
variance of the marginal subsidies. Since there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the mean marginal subsidies resulting from the second and third
order Taylor expansions - the conﬁdence intervals for the means just get
w i d e rd u et ot h ei n c r e a s e dv a r i a n c e-w ec h o o s et or e p o r tt h er e s u l t sf r o m
the parsimonious second order Taylor expanded model.
From Table C, we see that the CO2 parameter is still signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level with a parameter estimate of SEK 0.18 per kilo. The NOx
and SO2 parameters are insigniﬁcant whereas the employment eﬀect still is
signiﬁcant and equal to SEK 207,903 per annual employment in 1998. The
interaction variables between year and L now have insigniﬁcant parameters,
meaning that there no longer exist diﬀerences between the subsidies granted
for L in diﬀerent years. The results of the other anticipated environmental
eﬀects (ME1 − ME24) are similar to the results from the ﬁrst order Taylor
expansion. One exception is the insigniﬁcance of the previously signiﬁcant
negative ME4 parameter. Furthermore, the expansion terms include signif-
icant interaction eﬀects between CO2 and NOx (positive) and between CO2
and L (negative). That is, if a project have both CO2 and NOx eﬀects it is
rewarded, while a project with both CO2 and L eﬀects is punished. These
parameters are, however, small and, in most cases, not of economic signiﬁ-
cance. The parameter of the square of NOx is negative and signiﬁcant which
m e a n st h a tt h es u b s i d i e sg r a n t e df o rNOx reductions increase at a decreasing
rate. The R-square adjusted for the second order Taylor expansion is still
very high, 0.86.
5.2.1 Marginal Subsidy and Cost Eﬃciency
Turning to the marginal subsidy for CO2 reductions derived from the second
order Taylor expansion, Tables 5 and 6 show the small variability of the
marginal subsidy for CO2 reductions. For instance, Table 6 shows that the
95th percentile MSCO2 is approximately equal to the industry tax (in 2002
prices) during the program period, which means that MSCO2 in 95 percent of
the LIP projects is equal to or lower than the industry CO2 tax. Furthermore,
in almost 99 percent of the projects, MSCO2 is lower than the period’s lowest
household CO2 tax (2002 prices). Thus, for almost all the LIP projects, the
marginal subsidy for CO2 is lower than the prevailing CO2 tax.
Similarly, the MSSO2 is, in about 85 percent of the projects, lower than
the SO2 tax (2002 prices) and, in 97 percent of the projects, the MSNOx is
lower than the NOx fee (2002 prices).23
23The SO2 tax has been equal to SEK 30 since its introduction in 1991. In 2002 prices
the SO2 tax is: SEK 32 (1998-1999); SEK 31 (2000-2001); SEK 30 (2002). The NOx feeAllocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 15
Table 5: Household and industry CO2 taxes in SEK per kilo CO2, 1998-2002.
Consumer price index deﬂated 2002 prices within parentheses.
Household tax (SEK/kilo) Industry tax (SEK/kilo)
1998 0.37 (0.39) 0.18 (0.20)
1999 0.37 (0.39) 0.18 (0.20)
2000 0.37 (0.39) 0.18 (0.19)
2001 0.54 (0.55) 0.19 (0.19)
2002 0.63 (0.63) 0.19 (0.19)
Table 6: Marginal subsidies (MS) in 2002 prices from the second order Taylor
expansion; means, standard errors (SE) and percentiles.
Mean SE Percentiles (%)
MSk 15 09 09 59 9 N
CO2 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.40 602
NOx 7.17 5.23 -206.05 18.85 23.88 28.27 80.13 328
SO2 16.82 16.76 -37.12 -22.54 39.87 82.24 1,133 208
L 164,472 8,509 83,502 198,664 231,873 232,098 233,703 1,748
Note: SE is not corrected for the variation caused by estimation of the parameters
in MSk.
The box and whiskers plots in Figure 1 shows the great diﬀerence in
variability of the unconditional, average CO2 subsidy and the conditional
MSCO2 from the second order Taylor expanded model. Thus, when all other
environmental and employment eﬀects are taken into account, the variability
is considerably smaller (Figure 1 however excludes outside values).
5.3 Model Extensions and Sensitivity Analysis
Based on the ﬁrst order Taylor expansion, various model extensions were
tested for. Altogether four model extensions were made in a sequential fash-
ion. First, interaction variables between geographic location (county council
dummies) and some of the anticipated environmental eﬀects were included to
examine whether regional diﬀerences in severity of environmental problems
motivated diﬀerentiated LIP subsidies. Because acidiﬁcation and eutrophica-
tion are more severe in southern Sweden, larger subsidies to sulphur, nitrogen
has been equal to SEK 40 since its introduction in 1992. In 2002 prices the NOx fee is:
SEK 42 (1998-2000); SEK 41 (2001); SEK 40 (2002).Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 16
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MSCO2 (2002 prices) Average subsidy per kilo CO2 (2002 prices)
Figure 1: Dispersion of the conditional MSCO2 (top box) and the uncondi-
tional average subsidy per kilo CO2 (bottom box) in 2002 prices.
and phosphorus reductions to LIP projects in southern Sweden could be mo-
tivated. By using interaction variables between the 21 counties of Sweden
and the NOx,S O 2, phosphorus and nitrogen variables24,w eﬁnd some sig-
niﬁcant regional interaction eﬀects. The results are, however, too patchy and
inconsistent to prove the existence of regional mitigation strategies in the
allocation of the LIP subsidies.
Second, we employed indicator variables for municipal category according
to the Swedish Association of Local Authorities’ classiﬁcation.25 The 1998
allocation of the LIP subsidies had proved to be unequal with respect to
municipal category, where big and larger cities had received relatively more
subsidies than sparsely populated and rural municipalities (Riksdagens Re-
visorer, 1999). For the complete LIP allocation we ﬁnd no such results, i.e.
when all environmental and employments eﬀects are accounted for, there is
no diﬀerence in subsidies granted to municipalities of diﬀerent categories.
24Since there are a number of phosphorus and nitrogen variables in the LIP database, we
merged ME18, ME21 and ME17 into a “phosphorus emissions variable” and ME16, ME19,
ME20 into a “nitrogen emissions variable”. Then we employed interactions between these
merged variables and county council dummies in the regression analysis.
25This classiﬁcation contains nine diﬀerent categories based mainly on the municipali-
ties’ population, geographical location and employment characteristics. The nine diﬀerent
categories are: big cities; suburbs; larger cities; middle sized cities; industry municipalities;
rural municipalities; sparsely populated municipalities; other larger municipalities; other
smaller municipalities.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 17
Third, “political” variables were included to control for the political com-
position of the municipal council.26 Two variables previously shown by
Dahlberg and Johansson (1999) to aﬀect the extensive margin of the alloca-
tion decision - the shares of socialist and environmental party votes in the last
government election - were employed and their eﬀect on the intensive margin
of the LIP allocation was examined. No support whatsoever was, however,
found for these variables being of any signiﬁcance in the intensive margin
LIP allocation decision. Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence of “vote purchasing be-
haviour” (Dahlberg and Johansson, 1999) on the intensive margin of the LIP
allocation. It must, however, be stressed that we diﬀer from Dahlberg and
J o h a n s s o n ’ sa n a l y s i si nb o t hs a m p l es i z ea n ds c o p eo fa n a l y s i s .
Another variable used to control for the level of municipal politico-environmental
work, was the municipality’s environmental ranking. This environmental
ranking is based on a questionnaire to all Swedish municipalities performed
annually by the magazine “Miljö Eko” (Miljö Eko 1997:5; 1998:5; 2000:1;
2001:1 and http://www.miljo-eko.nu/kommunrank2001.htm).27 We have no
a priori hypothesis about the sign of the environmental ranking variable. On
one hand we believe that high environmental ranking could result in high
LIP subsidies because of a high municipal environmental awareness. On the
other hand, a low environmental ranking could result in higher subsidies
because of the larger need for environmental investments. However, the pa-
rameter turned out insigniﬁcant, implying that the municipality’s previous
environmental eﬀorts - large or small - did not aﬀe c tt h es i z eo ft h eL I P
subsidy.
Fourth, because one of the dual aims of the LIP was to reduce unemploy-
ment, we also included the municipality’s unemployment rate as a control
variable.28 The hypothesis we tested was whether the municipal “demand”
26Since the 1998 deadline for LIP applications was in February the same year, we use
the result from the 1994 election for the 1998 allocation. For the 1999-2002 allocations we
use the result from the September 1998 election.
27We used the environmental ranking in the previous year. The reason for using one
year lagged environmental rankings was mainly practical: Miljö Ekos environmental rank-
ing ceased in 2001. Noteworthy is that the environmental ranking variable is endogenous
in 1998. This is because the 1998 questionnaire included a question about whether the
municipality had applied for, or intended to apply for, the LIP subsidies. If the munici-
pality had applied or intended to apply the environmental ranking was higher. It is also
worth noting annual diﬀerences in the questionnaire and that the maximum attainable
score varied over the years. We use standardised (by the relevant year’s maximum points)
rankings consisting of an index between 0-100.
28The municipality’s unemployment rate consists of the number of persons in unemploy-
ment and labour market programs relative the corresponding municipal population group
(ﬁgures from the Swedish National Labour Market Administration, www.amv.se).Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 18
for employment aﬀected the size of the LIP subsidy, i.e. whether municipal-
ities with high unemployment got more subsidies. A little surprisingly, the
unemployment parameter turned out negative and signiﬁcant, meaning that
municipalities with high unemployment received signiﬁcantly less subsidies
than municipalities with lower unemployment. Possibly municipalities with
high unemployment applied less frequently and/or for smaller subsidies due
to them already receiving substantial government support for unemployment
reductions.
Since none of these model extensions increase the models’ explanatory
power dramatically or quantitatively alter the results of the variables of pri-
mary interest (CO2, NOx, SO2 and L)i nt h eﬁrst order expansion, we choose
to omit these results.29
In a sensitivity analysis performed by ﬁrst excluding the 1998 projects
and then the 2002 projects from the second order Taylor expansion, we ﬁnd
that exclusion of the 1998 projects aﬀects the mean and median marginal
subsidies more than exclusion of the 2002 projects. The diﬀerences in the
mean marginal subsidies for CO2, NOx and SO2 are, however, not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. The mean marginal subsidy to employment is, on the other
hand, signiﬁcantly higher in 1999-2002 than when the observations for 1998
are included. This result, which contradicts the ﬁndings from the ﬁrst order
Taylor expanded model, is solely due to two projects’ extreme reductions of
NOx in 1999 and 2000. If these outlier observations are removed, there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the mean MSL over the years.
6 Conclusions
We evaluate the allocation rationality and ex ante cost eﬃciency of a major
Swedish investment subsidy program, the LIP. The LIP, eﬀective between
1998−2002, had dual purposes: to step up the pace at which Sweden trans-
forms into an ecologically sustainable society and to reduce unemployment.
During the program period, more than 6.2 billion Swedish kronor (approxi-
mately C = 650 million) were granted to diﬀerent municipal projects, ﬁrst by
the government itself and then by the Swedish EPA.
Based on the government’s guidelines for LIP applications (Regeringskansliet,
2000a), we formulate a subsidy function where the magnitude of the subsidy
depends on the projects’ anticipated environmental and employment eﬀects.
We ﬁnd that the projects’ anticipated eﬀects to a high degree explain the
size of the LIP subsidy granted. Thus, the allocation of LIP subsidies appear
to have been rational, following an implicit weighing rule.
29The results are available from the author upon request.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 19
The marginal subsidy for CO2 reductions is lower than, or equal to, the
1998 − 2002 household CO2 tax in almost 99 percent of the projects (2002
prices). The marginal CO2 subsidy was also smaller than or equal to the
1998 − 2002 industry CO2 tax in 95 percent of the projects. Even though
cost eﬃciency was not an oﬃcial requirement in the LIP, evaluation of the
ex ante cost eﬃciency reveals that the LIP subsidy shows little variation
over projects and, thus, appears to be CO2 cost eﬃcient. Assuming project
fulﬁllment and that the prevailing CO2 tax is equal to the social value of the
beneﬁts obtained from CO2 reductions, our general conclusion is that the LIP
achieves CO2 emission reductions cost eﬃciently at low cost - provided that
the projects generate spillover eﬀects large enough to motivate the subsidy
in the ﬁrst place.
Similarly, if the value of the social beneﬁts received from NOx reductions
is equal to the NOx fee, emissions of NOx are also reduced at low cost in
the LIP. However, even if the marginal LIP subsidy for SO2 reductions is
lower than the SO2 tax in 85 percent of the projects, we see no cause for
the government to subsidize SO2 reductions. The reason is that the interim
target of the environmental quality objective “Natural Acidiﬁcation Only”
already is fulﬁlled. Since there are many other costly interim targets for
the environmental quality objectives, government funding should be directed
towards unfulﬁlled targets. Subsidizing already fulﬁlled targets is never an
eﬃcient environmental policy.
Whereas this ex ante analysis can provide information about the mecha-
nism governing the decision making and about the forecasted cost eﬃciency
of the LIP projects, ex post analysis, based on the LIP projects’ achieved
environment and employment eﬀects, can provide information about the real
outcomes. Ex post cost eﬃciency of the LIP projects is an issue that will be
addressed in future research. Last but not least, to justify a subsidy program
as sizable as the LIP, it is of utmost importance to gauge the magnitude of
the program’s spillover eﬀects.Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 20
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Appendix A: Variable Deﬁnitions
Table A: Variable and parameter deﬁnitions.
Variable/Parameter Deﬁnition
Y The LIP subsidy in SEK (2002 prices).
αCO2 Variable equal to one if the project had no anticipated CO2 eﬀects.
αNOx Variable equal to one if the project had no anticipated NOx eﬀects.
αSO2 Variable equal to one if the project had no anticipated SO2 eﬀects.
αL Variable equal to one if the project had no anticipated L eﬀects.
CO2 The reduction in CO2 emissions (kilos/year).
NOx The reduction in NOx emissions (kilos/year).
SO2 The reduction in SO2 emissions (kilos/year).
ME1 The reduction in emissions of volatile organic compounds (kilos/year).
ME2 Energy savings; electricity (MWh/year).
ME3 Energy savings; oil (MWh/year).
ME4 Energy savings (MWh/year).
ME5 Energy savings; other (MWh/year).
ME6 Energy conversion; oil to renewable energy (MWh/year).
ME7 Energy conversion; electricity to renewable energy (MWh/year).
ME8 Other energy conversion (MWh/year).
ME9 Return of phosphorus to cultivation soil (kilos/year).
ME10 Reduced amounts of waste; other (tonnes/year).
ME11 Reduced amounts of waste; sludge (solids in tonnes/year).
ME12 Reduced amounts of waste (tonnes/year).
ME13 Reduced amounts of waste; household waste (tonnes/year).
ME14 Reduced vehicle kilometers.
ME15 Reduced person kilometers.
ME16 Reduced water emissions; nitrogen to the Baltic Sea (kilos/year).
ME17 Reduced water emissions; phosphorus to the Baltic Sea (kilos/year).
ME18 Reduced water emissions; phosphorus to other (kilos/year).
ME19 Reduced water emissions; nitrogen to other (kilos/year).
ME20 Reduced emissions to water; nitrogen (kilos/year).
ME21 Reduced emissions to water; phosphorus (kilos/year).
ME22 Reduced use of CFC (kilos).
ME23 Soil measures to promote biological diversity (hectares).
ME24 Reduced use of natural gravel (tonnes/year).
L Direct employment as a consequence of the investment (annual
full-time employment opportunities).
DL98 Interaction variable; L and a year indicator variable for 1998.
DL99 Interaction variable; L and a year indicator variable for 1999.
DL00 Interaction variable; L and a year indicator variable for 2000.
DL01 Interaction variable; L and a year indicator variable for 2001.
Table A continues...Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 23
Table A continued...
Variable/Parameter Deﬁnition
DL02 Interaction variable; L and a year indicator variable for 2002.
G1 Indicator variable for projects in the group “Waste”.
G2 Indicator variable for projects in the group “Building measures”.
G3 Indicator variable for projects in the group “Remedial measures”.
G4 Indicator variable for projects in group “Energy eﬃciency measures”.
G5 Indicator variable for projects in group “Conversion to
renewable energy sources”.
G6 Indicator variable for projects in group “Multi-dimensional projects”.
G7 Indicator variable for projects in group “Industrial projects”.
G8 Indicator variable for projects in group “Nature conservation
and biological diversity”.
G9 Indicator variable for projects in group “Support measures”.
G10 Indicator variable for projects in group “Traﬃc”.
G11 Indicator variable for projects in group “Water and sewage”.
G12 Indicator variable for projects in group “Other projects”.
CO2NOx Interaction variable between CO2 and NOx.
CO2SO2 Interaction variable between CO2 and SO2.
CO2L Interaction variable between CO2 and L.
NOxSO2 Interaction variable between NOx and SO2.
NOxL Interaction variable between NOx and L.
SO2L Interaction variable between SO2 and L.
CO2
2 T h es q u a r eo fC O 2.
NO2
x T h es q u a r eo fN O x.
SO2
2 T h es q u a r eo fS O 2.
L2 T h es q u a r eo fL .Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 24
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics
Table B: Means, standard errors (SE), medians, number of zeros and
obserations (N) for the anticipated environmental and employment eﬀects.
Variable Mean SE Median Zeros N
CO2 1,149,381 231,610 0 1212 1814
NOx 11,168 7,191 0 1486 1814
SO2 1,171 383 0 1606 1814
ME1 28 21 0 1812 1814
ME2 99 26 0 1693 1814
ME3 123 45 0 1777 1814
ME4 503 377 0 1726 1814
ME5 555 207 0 1687 1814
ME6 646 320 0 1732 1814
ME7 337 192 0 1720 1814
ME8 520 287 0 1766 1814
ME9 239 112 0 1786 1814
ME10 90 38 0 1787 1814
ME11 73 51 0 1801 1814
ME12 2,496 2,400 0 1773 1814
ME13 31 21 0 1797 1814
ME14 47,760 30,168 0 1741 1814
ME15 385 333 0 1809 1814
ME16 67 30 0 1804 1814
ME17 6 3 0 1802 1814
ME18 6 2 0 1798 1814
ME19 69 25 0 1794 1814
ME20 1,651 450 0 1639 1814
ME21 95 40 0 1657 1814
ME22 3 3 0 1812 1814
ME23 3 3 0 1747 1814
ME24 40 29 0 1810 1814
L 11 1 3 66 1814Allocation and Ex Ante Cost Eﬃciency... 25
Appendix C: Results
Table C: Parameter estimates and standard errors (SE) from OLS
estimations of the ﬁrst and second order Taylor expanded models.
Dependent variable: Yijt
First order expansion Second order expansion
Variable/Parameter Estimate SE t Estimate SE t
α 2,672,494 605,385 4.41 2,067,392 597,842 3.46
αCO2 176,906 413,526 0.43 24,752 401,937 0.06
αNOx -529,696 449,967 -1.18 266,248 397,469 0.67
αSO2 -818,088 435,645 -1.88 -851,603 383,938 -2.22
αL -423,198 234,469 -1.80 -324,929 267,624 -1.21
CO2 0.06 0.02 2.92 0.18 0.08 2.24
NOx 0.46 0.09 5.10 22.70 22.77 1.00
SO2 23.29 10.87 2.14 -37.56 45.89 -0.82
L 255,982 13,008 19.68 207,903 41,205 5.05
ME1 59.20 35.29 1.68 69.10 28.96 2.39
ME2 778.89 307.97 2.53 712.07 315.56 2.26
ME3 104.37 76.92 1.36 43.08 80.96 0.53
ME4 -9.22 3.30 -2.79 -3.49 12.85 -0.27
ME5 28.95 15.99 1.81 19.36 13.69 1.41
ME6 243.70 22.95 10.62 -15.06 45.33 -0.33
ME7 -5.61 82.69 -0.07 -113.67 277.84 -0.41
ME8 -7.90 48.19 -0.16 -4.62 42.22 -0.11
ME9 7.20 28.12 0.26 8.96 29.65 0.30
ME10 997.81 615.81 1.62 983.64 661.49 1.49
ME11 501.65 89.13 5.63 797.86 325.45 2.45
ME12 2.52 1.31 1.93 2.00 1.06 1.88
ME13 -128.58 67.40 -1.91 -156.53 81.34 -1.92
ME14 0.02 0.44 0.04 -0.01 0.39 -0.02
ME15 3.72 0.75 4.97 3.47 0.86 4.03
ME16 -37.92 84.90 -0.45 59.31 77.64 0.76
ME17 1,258 1,284 0.98 162.92 259.80 0.63
ME18 -4,907 3,378 -1.45 -3,262 2,803 -1.16
ME19 -105.12 118.37 -0.89 -77.57 97.83 -0.79
ME20 10.41 7.54 1.38 10.93 7.78 1.41
ME21 -6.00 57.70 -0.10 -1.40 60.18 -0.02
ME22 1,145 214.60 5.34 1,452 567.89 2.56
ME23 426.49 1,814 0.24 -667.34 1,923 -0.35
ME24 -1,239 743.45 -1.67 -1,215 798.04 -1.52
G2 -1,975,792 1,985,423 -1.00 -1,592,870 1,876,799 -0.85
G3 9,116,573 3,294,731 2.77 9,781,399 3,424,042 2.86
G4 -827,714 487,071 -1.70 -751,513 465,634 -1.61
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Table C continued...
First order expansion Second order expansion
Variable/Parameter Estimate SE t Estimate SE t
G5 -1,121,743 564,072 -1.99 -1,045,240 560,069 -1.87
G6 -3,566,496 886,516 -4.02 -2,759,993 875,080 -3.15
G7 -1,768,647 539,496 -3.28 1,377,330 504,470 -2.73
G8 -760,259 477,129 -1.59 -899,831 481,012 -1.87
G9 -1,156,895 400,059 -2.89 -1,215,962 395,595 -3.07
G10 -212,278 575,382 -0.37 -125,280 570,101 -0.22
G11 -97,616 432,310 -0.23 -186,887 431,854 -0.43
G12 -1,114,847 474,699 -2.35 -1,141,907 486,589 -2.35
DL99 -79,264 37,747 -2.10 -9,479 62,844 -0.15
DL00 -139,902 46,269 -3.02 -104,438 58,553 -1.78
DL01 -191,865 28,004 -6.85 23,874 48,039 0.50
DL02 -130,096 91,468 -1.42 -70,041 99,063 -0.71
CO2NOx 1.86e-06 6.25e-07 2.97
CO2SOx 9.15e-07 1.41e-06 0.65
CO2L -1.35e-03 2.24e-04 -5.99
NOxSO2 1.66e-04 5.09e-04 0.33
NOxL -1.12 2.73 -0.41
SO2L 2.11 2.42 0.87
CO2
2 -6.10e-11 3.20e-10 -0.19
NO2
x -3.40e-06 1.09e-06 -3.12
SO2
2 6.67e-05 8.16e-05 0.82
L2 40.12 30.15 1.33
N 1,814 1,814
Adj R2 0.84 0.86
Note: Standard errors (SE) are estimated using the robust White estimator (Greene,
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